The ability to borrow (use leverage to trade assets) increases an individual's opportunity set. According to standard theories of decision-making under uncertainty, this makes individuals better off, because they can borrow to enter new positions without having to liquidate advantageous holdings. In contrast, we argue that leverage interacts with existing behavioral biases to impair financial decision-making. To identify leverage's effect, we exploit regulation that restricts the amount of leverage available to U.S. retail traders of foreign exchange. These traders make fewer trading mistakes -they have better market timing and less of a disposition effect -following the leverage constraint. We corroborate these findings in a controlled, incentivized laboratory experiment. Leverage leads to significantly lower earnings, and these lower earnings are caused by a greater tendency to hold losses. A dynamic model of cumulative prospect theory and realization utility explains these results. Together, our findings suggest that paternalistic regulations that constrain financial choices can improve welfare.
Introduction
It is well documented that investment biases, such as the disposition effect, affect most types of investors across a wide range of markets.
1 Across all asset markets, investors face constraints on their purchasing decisions. Investors can be capital constrained, constrained by the market's liquidity, or regulations place physical restrictions on trading activity (e.g., they limit the amount of leverage one can trade with). As a result, studies that rely on observed trading data to catalog investor behavior may present an incomplete picture of the extent of these biases. Moreover, it is also possible that trading constraints, rather than investor psychology, are catalysts of investors' biases.
To illustrate, consider how trading constraints can affect the measurement of one of the most commonly studied investor biases, the disposition effect [Shefrin and Statman, 1985] . Suppose that a trader wishes to purchase stock of a firm that just received good news. Assuming this trader does not have infinite wealth, the trader can either borrow funds (use leverage) or liquidate existing portfolio holdings to finance the stock's purchase. In most asset markets, the ability to borrow funds to trade is tightly restricted, and so the trader needs to sell some of their assets. As a result, traders' sell decisions are driven by the desire to purchase an attractive prospect in conjunction with the purchasing constraints. The disposition effect is measured by comparing the propensity to sell assets that have gained or lost value, and as this example shows, sale decisions cannot be properly evaluated without taking into account the markets' trading constraints.
In this paper, we show that increasing opportunity sets by removing constraints on leverage can systematically impair decision-making under risk. Yet, under standard theories of risky decision-making, such as expected utility (EUT), individuals are at least as well off when they have access to leverage, because it expands their budget constraint. Access to leverage increases the trader's opportunity set by allowing them to take on new positions without liquidating current holdings.
Contrary to conventional theory, research in behavioral economics and finance offers clues that access to leverage may actually exacerbate traders' behavioral biases, and harm individual welfare. Specifically, individuals' reluctance to realize losses is suboptimal, both from the perspective of realized returns [Odean, 1998 ] and the trader's own ex-ante preferences [Imas, 2016] . The most parsimonious explanation for this reluctance to realize losses is prospect theory with realization utility -experiencing realized losses (gains) feel worse (better) than equivalent paper outcomes (Barberis and Xiong [2012] ). Under this theory, access to leverage can exacerbate a trader's reluctance to realize losses. Without leverage, an investor holding a losing asset makes a trade off between the expected returns of keeping it and the expected returns of a prospective purchase, which would require selling the asset and bearing the costs of negative realization utility. If the expected returns of the prospect are high enough, she bears the negative realization costs and makes the purchase. On the other hand, when given greater access to leverage, traders can now make the purchase without having to realize the loss. This allows the trader to escalate commitments to the losing asset by putting off the negative realization. In turn, access to leverage exacerbates the disposition effect. Because the selling of losses should primarily be driven by signals of expected returns rather than the avoidance of negative realization utility, greater access to leverage further worsens market timing and leads to lower returns.
Indeed, we provide multiple sources of evidence that leverage impairs decision-making and investment performance. First, we examine the trading of retail investors in the market for foreign exchange (forex) before and after their access to leverage was restricted. Second, we explore the effect of leverage on investment behavior in an incentivized laboratory experiment. The two studies are complimentary:
results from the forex market offer insight from a more naturalistic environment, while the findings from the experiment replicate the same behavioral patterns in a controlled setting. The consistency in the observed effects of leverage on investment decisions and performance increases confidence in the generalizability of these results.
To identify how leverage affects trading behavior in a natural setting, we exploit 2010 CFTC regulation that restricts brokerages' provision of leverage to traders in the retail market for foreign exchange at a cap of 50:1 per-trade. Prior to the regulation, most brokerages set leverage limits well above the 50:1 constraint. Crucial for identification, most brokerages also have unregulated clients in Europe. These
European traders have similar characteristics as their U.S. counterparts, making them a suitable control group to study leverage's effect on trading.
Using a data set that includes around 270,000 trades made by 1,000 traders, we document a robust negative correlation between the amount of leverage used and traders' market timing per-trade. We provide evidence of a causal relationship by estimating difference-in-difference regressions that compare U.S. traders subject to restrictions in leverage to unregulated European traders. The leverage constraint improves U.S. traders' performance by 1.9 basis points per-trade, an effect that is equal to half of a standard deviation increase. Consistent with the results being caused by the reduction in leverage, the effect of the regulation is strongest for traders that use at least 50:1 leverage prior to the constraint.
Furthermore, the reduction in available leverage reduces by about 13 percent traders' disposition effect -the tendency to sell winners more quickly than losers. The effect is confined to traders' market orders and not their limit orders. Traders manually issue market orders to immediately execute. Traders set limit orders to execute automatically at a predetermined price, in effect making traders commit to a pre-specified gain or loss. Hence, this result suggests that a key mechanism behind our findings is that reducing leverage makes traders less susceptible to escalations of commitment.
To compliment the findings from the forex market, we conduct a laboratory experiment where individuals make a series of investment decisions over thirty periods, either with access to leverage or not.
Participants are endowed with 2000 units of experimental currency and allocate these funds between six different risky assets. Participants are told that each asset has a probability of either going up or down in price that remains constant throughout the experiment. Some assets have a higher probability of going up in price than others, but the exact probabilities are not revealed to the participants. In each period, the participant observes the new price of each asset and decides which to buy and which to sell. She can take as long as she wants to rebalance her portfolio subject to her budget constraint, before continuing to the next period and making the same decision again. In the "No Leverage" treatment, the participants' buying decisions are constrained by their portfolio's value and any outstanding balance in their account. The "Leverage" treatment offers participants the opportunity to borrow 500 more units of currency to either purchase more assets or leave deposited in their account. The borrowed amount would be subtracted from their final earnings at the end of the experiment, which would then be converted to US dollars.
Results from the experiment mirror our findings from the forex market. Participants with access to leverage earn significantly less money in the experiment than those without it. Those with leverage earn nearly 150 fewer units of currency relative to a simple benchmark of a 1/N investment strategy, and end up with 200 fewer units of currency as their final wealth. Access to leverage increased participants' disposition effect. The disposition effect has a direct negative effect on participants' earnings. For those who used the leverage, the impact operated on the loss side -the ability to borrow decreased their propen-sity to realize losses without changing the propensity to realize gains. Together, our findings suggest that access to leverage can exacerbate biased decision-making and lead to worse investment performance.
This paper contributes to a growing literature at the intersection of behavioral economics and personal financial management. This literature identifies a host of cognitive shortcomings that cause investment biases and reduce individuals' welfare. These biases include overconfidence (e.g., Barber and Odean [2001] ), loss aversion (e.g., Barberis and Huang [2001] ), present-biased preferences (e.g., Laibson
[1997]), mis-calibrated expectations (e.g., Bordalo et al. [2013] ), and social preferences or contagion (see the review in Hirshleifer [2015] ). Our paper diverges from these efforts by studying the role of increased choice sets on decision-making. Some research considers the limits to attention and how individuals make use of large choice sets. Theories in this area suggest that constraints on cognitive capacity cause consumers to develop simplified models of decision-making, but are otherwise fully rational (e.g., Gabaix
[2014]). Our focus is distinct in that it considers how expanding an individual's choice set can actually make some people more susceptible to existing behavioral biases. Indeed, some evidence from the behavioral economics literature suggests that the notion of more opportunities being better may not always hold. As the size of the choice set increases, people begin selecting simpler, less complicated options [Iyengar and Kamenica, 2010] , make dominated choices [Bhargava et al., 2017] , and sometimes prefer to avoid making a choice altogether [Iyengar and Lepper, 2000] .
Our paper has a more specific application to the role of financial leverage in individual decisionmaking. Research in this area is important, because of the well-established connection between consumer leverage and aggregate outcomes, with the substantial rise in housing prices during the mid-2000s being a notable example (Geanakoplos [2010] Finally, this research significantly contributes to our understanding of the disposition effect by providing evidence that dynamics in mental decision-making can play a crucial role in explaining this heavily-studied investment bias. Specifically, out tests show that some individuals enter into gambles, but have trouble sticking to their dynamic plans. Instead, they escalate commitments to their trading mistakes, which exacerbates the disposition effect. This finding is similar in spirit to recent work arguing that investors use distinct mental accounts to construct "episodes" from which to evaluate their investments (Frydman et al. [2017] ). Frydman et al. [2017] finds that there is no disposition effect when traders reinvest their holdings in new positions. Yet, they cannot easily explain why some positions are reinvested while others are liquidated without reinvestment. Our paper shows that, as long as they have the option to delay the dis-utility associated with closing a mental account, traders will delay liquidation.
This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the retail foreign exchange market and the CFTC regulation, tests the relation between leverage and trading behavior. Section 3 outlines the experimental paradigm and demonstrates the effect of increased leverage on investment performance. Section 4 provides a discussion of the results and concludes.
Evidence from Restricting the Leverage Available to Retail Traders

The Retail Forex Market and the CFTC Regulations
The retail forex market barely existed in the early 2000s, but has experienced unprecedented growth for more than a decade. According to King and Rime [2010] , its volume in 2010 was estimated to be between 125 and 150 billion USD per day, roughly the same as daily turnover on the entire NYSE family of stock exchanges.
Retail forex brokerages are organized as market-making systems. Brokers continuously offer bid and ask quotes to their customers. Each brokerage maintains a proprietary algorithm for generating quotes that are based on their own inventory and a data-feed from the interbank market. The brokerage is the counterparty on all transactions, responsible for off-loading inventory into the interbank market.
When brokers quote bid or ask prices, they charge a spread over interbank prices. Therefore trading costs are in proportion to the size of the trade, and depend on the bid-ask spreads charged by brokers, relative to bid-ask spreads in interbank markets. Brokerages do not charge any additional fees per transaction.
Retail brokerages give clients the option to use leverage on their trades at no additional upfront cost. For example, a U.S. or European trader could decide to take a 100,000 EUR position in the EUR/USD using 20,000 EUR (or the USD equivalent) of their own capital, while borrowing the difference from the brokerage. The trader uses 5:1 leverage in this example. A distinguishing feature of the forex market is that a significant number of brokerages have clients from around the world. However, there is no centralized, worldwide regulatory authority. Brokerages must comply with domestic regulations in each country that they operate. This requires brokerages to segment their clientele according to country of origin. Verification of a client's home country is done using government-issued documentation, such as a passport, and a link to a domestic bank account from which to withdraw and deposit funds. Consequently, it would be challenging and costly for a retail client to search for a preferred regulatory regime. Therefore, the structure of the market is beneficial to this research, because it is possible to compare regulated U.S. traders to their lightly-regulated European counterparts while accounting for brokerage features that may otherwise vary across countries.
A related paper, Heimer and Simsek [2017] , studies the effects of the CFTC regulations on the retail forex market. Several of their findings suggest that the CFTC leverage constraint is well-suited to identifying the effect of leverage on trading outcomes. They find that the constraint has no effect on the market's liquidity or the costs of trading set by the brokerages. Hence, concurrent changes in the forex market are unlikely to confound estimates of the leverage constraints' effect on trading performance and biases.
They also find that the leverage constraint causes an increase in traders' return on investment and that the forex brokerages become less profitable. Taken together, these results suggest that the leverage constraint led to reduced rent-extraction by forex brokerages. For our purposes, this provides evidence that the CFTC regulation was effective in imposing constraints on the relationship between brokerages and their clients.
Trading Data
Our analysis uses a trade-and portfolio-level data set that was compiled by a social networking website that, for privacy purposes, is called myForexBook. Registering with myForexBook-which is free-requires a trader to have an open account on one of seventy retail specific forex brokerages (by the time of the CFTC regulation, around forty-five brokerages had partnered with myForexBook and allowed traders to use the service). After registering, myForexBook can access the trader's complete trading records at these brokerages. New trades are executed on a trader's brokerage, and myForexBook records them timestamped to the second. Hence, an advantage of the data is that there are no concerns about reporting bias.
That the data comes from a large sample of brokerages is a clear advantage for our analysis, because brokerages may have different responses to the regulations and the traders that choose a given brokerage may be unrepresentative of the population of retail traders. Yet, a possible drawback of our data is that the trading records are compiled by a social networking website, and traders that use social networks could be idiosyncratic. Fortunately, prior work show that myForexBook traders are not dissimilar from other retail traders studied by the literature, and myForexBook traders are representative of retail forex traders more generally. Heimer [2016] documents that myForexBook traders exhibit trading biases that are similar to those of common stock traders on a large discount brokerage, that since its first use in Odean [1998] , has been seminal to the behavioral finance literature. Heimer and Simsek [2017] show that myForexBook traders and the complete set of traders on one of the largest retail forex brokerages have similar performance. They also find that myForexBook traders' trading volume covaries strongly with retail forex obligations using reports filed by the complete set of brokerages that are regulated by the CFTC.
Comparing U.S. to European Traders
European traders are a suitable control group to estimate the effect of the leverage constraint on U.S.
traders. Not only do they tend to trade similar assets and their trading hours overlap, but we find evidence that they have similar personal characteristics and trading behaviors. Table A Using observations from the pre-leverage constraint sample period (September 1 to October 17, 2010), treatment and control traders average 155 trades, 6.7 trades per day on days that they trade, trade 6.5 distinct currency pairs, and use more than 50:1 leverage on an average of 12 percent of trades. Table A .2, Panel B uses a probit model to test the probability of being a U.S. trader as a function of these observable characteristics. The regression estimates confirm that these personal and trading characteristics do not differ across locations. All of the coefficient estimates are statistically indistinguishable from zero, including trader age when the regression includes age and age squared. Furthermore, the re-gression's pseudo-R 2 is small (0.018), suggesting that these observable characteristics do a poor job of explaining which traders are from the U.S. In other words, whether a trader is in the control or treatment group is as good as random with respect to trader characteristics -characteristics that could be relevant to the relationship between leverage and trading outcomes.
Leverage Constraints and Market Timing Performance 2.4.1 Empirical relation between leverage and performance
We first test how leverage affects trading performance. We measure trading performance by calculating per-trade returns excluding the trade's leverage and fees. Specifically, unlevered returns equals
where s τ is the spot price when the position is opened and s τ +l is the spot price when the position is closed. The measure captures how good a trader is at timing the market.
We test traders' market timing performance using the following regression
where j is a trade made by trader i at time t (trades are recorded at the second, but we tend to set γ t as a daily fixed effect). Log(leverage) is the natural logarithm of the amount of leverage used on a given trade.
The variable F p,t is a cross-country interest rate differential, that captures the expected return to holding a safe asset in the currency-pair p's base currency. Trade is a vector of trade characteristics that includes the size of the trader's stake in the position and the position's holding period. Sometimes we include in this specification brokerage-currency pair fixed effects, in order to capture potential differences across brokerages in the fees and liquidity of different currencies across different brokerages. We double-cluster standard errors to account for correlated residuals by trader and day.
There is a robust negative relation between traders' market timing performance and the amount of leverage they use per trade (Table 2) . Doubling a trade's leverage is associated with about a one basis point increase in market timing performance, which is between one-third and one-fourth of a standard deviation in per-trade performance. The result is robust to using trader and day fixed effects, as well as brokerage-currency pair fixed effects. Columns 3 includes the trade's size and column 4 includes the length of its holding period. Controlling for the trade's holding period dampens the negative relation between leverage and trading performance, which could be consistent with the relationship being related to traders' disposition effect.
Difference-in-difference estimates
To credibly estimate how leverage affects trading performance, we use a difference-in-difference specification:
The variable US trader equals one if the trader is from the U.S, and equal to zero if they are from Europe.
Post constraint equals one if the trade is opened after November 18, 2010, the date by which brokerages needed to comply with the CFTC's mandate to cap the provision of leverage at 50:1, and zero otherwise (few trades are open before the leverage constraint and closed afterwards).The coefficient β 1 estimates the average treatment effect of the CFTC regulation on traders' market timing performance.
There are a few reasons why we are confident that equation 2 identifies the effect of leverage on trading performance. First, we provide evidence that European traders are a good control group for U.S.
traders. Appendix table A.2 shows that U.S. and European traders have similar characteristics -they have similar levels of trading experience, use similar trading styles, and have similar activity in the social network (U.S. trades are on average two years older than European traders -38-year-old versus 36-years-old).
We also present visual evidence that the difference-in-difference test satisfies the parallel trends assumption. Estimates of the difference-in-difference regression confirm that the leverage constraint improves the performance of U.S. traders. In Table 3 , columns 1 and 2, the estimate of β 1 is equal to about 1.9 basis points, and is statistically significant at the ten percent error level.
A potential limitation of these tests is that, though U.S. traders are constrained by the CFTC regulations, not all traders use much leverage when they trade. This means that our estimates capture the intent-to-treat effect of the leverage restriction, but not necessarily the treatment-on-the-treated effect, which could understate the impact of the leverage constraint.
To address this limitation, we find that the leverage constraint has the strongest effect on traders that use a lot of leverage, precisely those who are most likely to be affected by the regulation. Table 3 , column 3 and 4 estimate equation 2 for the sample of traders that use at least 50:1 leverage on some trades prior the CFTC regulation. For these traders, the estimate of β 1 equals between 2.5 and 3.6 basis points. Column 5 and 6 use the sample of traders that did not use this much leverage, and the estimate of β 1 equals between 1.2 and 1.9 basis points, and loses statistical significance. Because the estimate gets larger as our tests focus on the sample of traders most subject to the leverage constraint treatment, it suggests that our estimates may understate leverage's affect on traders' performance. 
Leverage Constraints and the Disposition Effect
We use linear probability models to estimate traders' disposition effect, because most traders in our data do not have multiple positions open at the same time. This differs from the original tests of the disposition, developed by Odean [1998] , which compares the ratio of realized gains to paper gains to the ratio of realized losses to paper losses. The Odean [1998 ] methodology makes it difficult to control for relevant characteristics of the trade, and to address this shortcoming, most of the subsequent literature uses linear probability regressions similar to ours (e.g., Grinblatt and Keloharju [2001] , Chang et al. [2016] ). The other weakness of the Odean [1998] method is that the magnitude of the estimate of the disposition effect is significantly affected by the number of assets in the trader's portfolio.
We use the following regression estimated using OLS to test the relation between leverage constraints and the disposition effect:
The regressions include multiple observations per each trade j, one for every 10-minute holding period t until the position closes. The dependent variable sale equals one in the period the position is closed by trader i, zero otherwise. The independent variable gain equals one if the current market price is above the currency's purchase price and equals zero otherwise. In addition to trader and calendar time fixed effects (γ i and γ t , respectively), the regressions include indicators for the trade's holding period, one for every 10-minute interval until the position is closed. 5 To interpret the regression, the coefficient on gain reflects the change in the hazard rate when the position is a paper gain. A positive estimate of β 1 implies that traders are more likely to sell positions at a gain than at a loss, which indicates a disposition effect.
The coefficient on the interaction term between gain and post constraint, β 2 , measures the change in the disposition effect as a result of having less available leverage. Table 4 presents estimates of equation 3. We estimate the regressions separately for market and limit orders (Panel A and Panel B, respectively). Market orders execute manually immediately when requested by the trader. 6 Limit order in the retail forex market are stop-loss or take-profit orders, which set the position to close when the price hits a threshold that the trader sets in advance. As a consequence, we conjecture that the use of limit orders help traders stick to a plan and maintain their commitment to closing a trade. The emotional effects of leveraged trading would have more of an effect on traders' market orders and not their limit orders. 7 Also, we separately estimate the disposition effect for U.S. (columns 1 and 2, with and without trader fixed effects, respectively) and European traders (columns 3 and 4).
Estimates of equation 3 provide evidence that reduced leverage lessens traders' disposition effect.
The estimate of β 2 is between -0.007 and -0.009 for U.S. traders' market orders and is statistically significant at the five percent level (columns 1a and 2a). These coefficient estimates indicate that the leverage 5 We set the maximum holding period at two hours, because closing positions becomes increasingly less frequent at longer time horizons (the mean and median trade is held for just a little more than an hour). 6 Technically, market orders execute as soon as the brokerage can locate a counter-party for the trade, and any delay between the order to execute and completing the transaction is called slippage. In practice in the foreign exchange market, there is little concern about slippage due to the market's tremendous liquidity.
7 Linnainmaa [2010] and Fischbacher et al. [2017] provide further motivation for distinguishing between traders' market and limit orders when measuring the disposition effect.
constraint causes an economically significant reduction in traders' disposition effect. The unconditional propensity to sell gains relative to losses is approximately equal to 0.055 (the estimate of β 2 ). Hence, the leverage constraint reduces by about fifteen percent traders' disposition effect.
Consistent with an emotional response to the reduction in leverage, the constraint does not statistically significantly affect the disposition effect for traders' limit orders (columns 1b and 2b). The constraint also does not affect European traders' disposition effect (columns 3(a, b) and 4(a, b) ), suggesting that the results are caused by the reduced availability of leverage and not by variation in market conditions before and after the CFTC regulation.
Furthermore, Figure 2 lets us examine whether the reduction in the disposition effect is because traders hold gains longer or sell losers more quickly, or both. The figure presents hazard rates for the amount of time to execution of the trade conditional on whether the trade is paper gain or paper loss. We find that the reduction in disposition effect is due to traders being more quick to sell losing trades. The hazard rate on realized losses falls when after the constraint, while there is no difference in the hazard rate for gains before or after the constraint.
Limitations of the Empirical Evidence
There are a few limitations of these tests that motivate us to conduct a controlled laboratory experiment on trading with leverage. Notably, the experiment can help address any potential shortcomings of our identification, such as the fact that we have only a single event from which to test the effect of a leverage constraint. Also, most of the traders in our retail data do not have multiple positions open at the same time. This limits our measurement of the disposition effect to tests that rely on the timing of sell and buy decisions, without having a concurrent portfolio of unrealized assets from which to compare.
But most crucially, we cannot determine precisely what it is about access to leverage that causes traders to have worse performance and a greater disposition effect. There are two plausible candidates. 
Experimental Evidence on Trading With Leverage
Experimental Design
We designed a portfolio choice experiment to test the effect of leverage on decision-making in a risky environment. Our design was based on the experiment of Fischbacher et al. [2017] who examines the effect of stop-loss and take-gain orders on the disposition effect. Investors made a series of investment decisions over the course of multiple periods, choosing which assets to hold, sell, or buy given their budget constraint. Investors formed portfolios of up to six different tests. As a result, our experimental test of the disposition effect will be better able to handle the idea of "selling winners, holding losers." The forex data does accommodate that sort of test, because traders tend to hold one asset at a time.
Investors (N = 84) were recruited from Amazon Mechanical Turk for a base payment of $1. Each was endowed with 2000 experimental currency units (ECU). Each investor's earnings in ECU were converted to dollars at the end of the experiment at a rate of 500 ECU to $2 USD, and delivered to her as a bonus payment. In the experiment, investors traded six different assets labeled Goods 1-6. In total, the experiment consisted of 34 periods (Period -3 to 30). In period -3 the investor received the endowment but could not trade through period -1. Instead they observe the price development for the goods to facilitate learning. From period 0 onwards the investor could buy and sell goods. In period 0, she used all of her endowment to purchase different quantities of the Goods; after period 0, she was able to buy and sell Goods as you see fit.
Investors were told that in each period, the price of each good either went up by 6% or went down by 5%. In order to ensure that investor behavior was not affected by strategic considerations, the probability of a price increase or decrease was determined by a probability that was specific to each good. Particularly, the probability that the price would increase in any given period was different across the six Goods.
For example, take Goods 1 and 4. In any given period, Good 1 had a 40% probability that its price would go up by 6% (and a 30% probability that its price will go down by 5%), while Good 4 had a 70% probability that its price would go up (and a 30% probability that its price will go down). Investors were told that the probability of a price increase for each good did not change from period to period. It was not affected by outcomes in previous periods; in each period a computerized randomization device determined whether the price of each Good would increase or decrease according to the Good-specific probability. Investors were not told the exact probabilities of price increases (or decreases) for the different goods. They could learn about the probabilities by watching price movements.
Each of the six Goods had a starting price of 100 in period -3. Afterwards the price of each Good changed according to its respective probability. In period 0 the prices reset back to 100 to allow investors to fully allocate their endowment. They could then begin begin trading. In each period, investors saw how many shares of each good they owned, the current price of each good and the last purchase price of each good. They also saw a table that contained the prior prices of each good in every previous period, as well as how many shares of each good they bought or sold in the past.
Investors could buy additional units of goods as long as the money on their account exceeds the price for one unit of the respective good. The investor could sell any of the goods in her portfolio at the prevailing price; the earned currency would be deposited into the account and could be used to either make purchases in the same period or be carried over to the next.
In the Leverage treatment, the investor also had the opportunity to borrow 500 additional CEU. If she chose to borrow the points, they would be added to her account balance in that period and used to make additional purchases or be carried over to the next period. The investor would have to pay back these 500 CEU by the end of the experiment. Paying back the borrowed currency could happen at any time by clicking a button on the screen. If the investor had not paid back the currency by the end of the experiment, they would be deducted from her earnings. Leverage could only be used if the net worth of the investor's portfolio exceeded 500 CEU. In the No Leverage condition, the investor could not borrow additional currency.
At the end of the experiment, all Goods were sold and the final prices. The earnings were then converted to USD and paid to the investor. Investors then filled out a short survey that asked for their gender, age, and elicited measures of patience and risk tolerance. The patience measure asked investors to indicate their general level of patience, in the form of "How patient are you in general? (on a scale from intertemporal choice behavior in several representative samples [Vischer et al., 2012] . The risk tolerance measure asked investors to choose their general tolerance of risk, in the form of "How willing are you to take risks in general? (on a scale from 1 'unwilling' to 7 'fully prepared')." This measure has also been validated to predict real-world risk-taking behavior across representative samples [Dohmen et al., 2011] .
Measuring the Disposition Effect
We followed Fischbacher et al. [2017] in measuring the disposition effect in our experiment. Their measurement is analogous to Odean [1998] where the propensity to realize gains and losses is calculated in relation to the opportunity set. Given the importance of a salient last purchase price in driving the disposition effect [Frydman and Rangel, 2014] , goods were classified as winners or losers whether their current prices were above or below the last purchase price. The proportions of winners realized (PWR) and losers realized (PLR) corresponded to the following:
sales of a winner possibilities of selling winners (4) P LR = sales of a loser possibilities of selling losers
The disposition effect (DE) is calculated as the difference between these two proportions: DE = P W R − P LR. The range of the DE measure goes from -1 to 1, with 1 corresponding to an extreme disposition effect (keeping losers and selling winners), 0 corresponding to no disposition effect, and -1 corresponding to a reverse disposition effect (keeping winners and selling losers).
The proportions were calculated in each period. They depend on the possibilities of selling winners or losers in that period, which corresponds to the number of winners and losers in the investor's portfolio.
For example, take an investor who held 5 units of Good 1 and 5 units of Good 2 in the second period. She had bought Good 1 and 2 for 100 CEU per share; in the third period, the price of Good 1 was 106 and the price of Good 2 was 95. The possibilities of selling winners in that period was equal to 5, the same as the possibilities of selling losers. Suppose the investor sells 3 shares of Good 1 and 2 shares of Good 2. Her P W R = 3/5 and her P LR = 2/5, corresponding to a positive disposition effect of 1/5.
Results of Trading Experiment
We report summary statistics on the demographics of our sample in Table 5 . There were no significant differences on observables such as gender, age and proxies for risk and patience between the two conditions.
The Effect of Leverage on Earnings
We begin by examining the effect of access to leverage on earnings. Since we are interested in how access to leverage impacts investment behavior, we first consider performance relative to a simple buy-and-hold strategy. Specifically, since price movements vary randomly between periods, we first calculate how well the investor would have done if she had split her endowment evenly between the goods in the first period and held that portfolio for the rest of the experiment. This 1/N holding strategy is a conservative benchmark for performance since it does not allow for learning about the underlying success probabilities of the goods. In the analysis that follows, investor performance is calculated by subtracting final earnings under the 1/N holding strategy from the investor's actual final earnings. Positive numbers correspond to the investor outperforming the strategy; negative numbers correspond to the investor underperforming the strategy. Figure 3 shows performance relative to the 1/N holding strategy by condition. Access to leverage leads to substantially worse performance in terms of earnings relative to the 1/N holding strategy, compared to the No Leverage condition. Table 6 shows results from OLS regressions of performance on a treatment dummy (1=Leverage, 0=No Leverage) confirming the significant difference in performance.
While investors in the No Leverage treatment significantly outperformed the 1/N holding strategy, suggesting a positive effect of learning, investors in the Leverage treatment performed just as well as the benchmark. Performance relative to the benchmark is significantly lower for those with access to leverage compared to those without it, and the effect is robust to the inclusion of control variables such as age, gender and proxies for risk tolerance and patience. The difference in performance between the two conditions corresponds to approximately 47% of one standard deviation relative to the mean performance.
We also examine the effect of leverage on overall final earnings. Figure 3 and Table 6 present those results as well. Given that investment in the market has a net positive return, we see that investors in both treatments end up with higher final earnings than the 2000 ECU endowment. Importantly, however, investors with access to leverage end the experiment with significantly lower earnings than those without leverage. As shown in Table 6 , this difference is robust to the inclusion of control variables, and
corresponds to approximately 41% of one standard deviation relative to mean final earnings.
The Effect of Leverage on the Disposition Effect
Having established the negative effect of leverage on performance and final earnings, we examine the behavioral channel that could have led to this effect. Based on our hypotheses and results from the forex market data, we expect that access to leverage exacerbates investors' disposition effect. Specifically, the ability to borrow allows investors to hold on to losing goods for longer while still taking taking advantage of buying opportunities. Since in our setting, goods that have gone down in price are more likely to keep going down in price, the disposition effect should have a negative impact on earnings.
We examine this proposition by regressing per period earnings on the investor's disposition effect in the previous period. Results from this analysis are presented in Table 7 . We see that indeed, a larger disposition effect in the previous period corresponds to lower earnings in the next. A 1% increase in the disposition effect corresponds to a decrease in per-period earnings of approximately 316 ECU. This effect is equal to 44% of one standard deviation in mean per period earnings, and is robust to the inclusion of control variables.
In order to examine whether access to leverage increased the disposition effect, we regress the measure on a treatment dummy. The results presented in Table 8 mirror the findings from the forex market: access to leverage in our setting resulted in a greater per-period disposition effect. Access to leverage lead to a 6% average increase in the disposition effect, which corresponds to approximately 19% of one standard deviation of the mean.
Finally, we explore whether access to leverage increased the disposition effect by affecting the propensity to sell winners, losers, or both. Looking at the overall sample, investors who had access to leverage seemed to increase their propensity to sell winners (effect on PWR: β = .05, p = .03) and (directionally) decreased their propensity to sell losers (effect on PLR: β = −.02, p = .31). Mirroring the analysis of forex traders captured in Figure 2 , we examine behavior of investors who actually took advantage of the leverage (treatment on the treated). Here we see a pattern of behavior that is analogous to the results from the forex market. Those who used the leverage had a significantly lower propensity to sell losers (effect on PLR: β = −.06, p = .02) than investors in the No Leverage condition, while their propensity to sell winners did not change (effect on PWR: β = −.01, p = .71). Figure 4 illustrates these results.
Together, our findings from the investment experiment provide additional evidence for the potentially detrimental effects of leverage on performance. We also corroborate the behavioral results from the forex market, demonstrating that the ability to borrow exacerbates investors' reluctance to realize losses relative to gains.
Conclusion
This paper studies how leverage affects decision-making under uncertainty. The option to use leverage lets individuals enter new positions without liquidating prior holdings. Using regulation that restricts the provision of leverage to retail forex traders, as well as an incentivized laboratory experiment, we find that access to leverage impairs decision-making. Traders and experiment participants have worse trading performance and a higher disposition effect when they have access to leverage. These results suggest that leverage lets individuals delay the costs of negative realization, which is consistent with a dynamic model of prospect theory with realization utility. All in all, traders do less with more.
Our findings have important implications for both aggregate prices of financial assets, and for consumer financial protection. With respect to the former, consider an individual that purchases an asset with at least some leverage. The price of the asset rises, but then the fundamental value of the asset is revealed to be below the asset's price. Because the individual used leverage to purchase the asset, she can use her unspent capital to finance other purchases, while avoiding the realization dis-utility that would come with liquidating the asset. Clearly, this has the potential to sustain prices that deviate from fundamentals, even without limits to arbitrage (Shleifer and Vishny [1997] ). It can also cause larger run-ups in prices, because it reduces downward price-pressure. Indeed, the link between leverage and irregular asset price movements is well documented (Geanakoplos [2010] ).
Our findings also provide justification for paternalistic regulations in consumer financial markets.
The debate in the consumer financial protection literature tends to center on the "tension between laissez faire and interventionist tendencies" (Campbell 2016, pg. 1) . We show that expanding choice sets can cause consumers to escalate commitments to financial mistakes when they are personally responsible for managing their financial decisions. This suggests that regulations that constrain financial decisions can improve personal welfare. We suspect that our findings generalize across markets that are subject to consumer financial protections. 
Unlevered returns equals (for long positions) the spot price when the position in the currency is closed minus the spot price when the position opened, divided by the spot price when it is opened (visa versa for short positions). The variable leverage is the amount of leverage used in each trade. Cross-country interest rate differentials are Fp,t = i b,t − iq,t, where i is the daily change in the risk-free rate for the currency of the base country b and quote country q. T rade is a vector that includes the trade's size and holding period. Trader and day fixed-effects are γ i and γt, respectively. Standard errors are double-clustered by day and trader, and *, **, and *** denote the following significance levels p < 0.10 , p < 0.05 , and p < 0.01 , respectively. 
Unlevered.returns equals (for long positions) the spot price when the position in the currency is closed minus the spot price when the position opened, divided by the spot price when it is opened (visa versa for short positions). Cross-country interest rate differentials are Fp,t = i b,t − iq,t, where i is the daily change in the risk-free rate for the currency of the base country b and quote country q. US trader equals one if the trader is located in the U.S. and equals zero if located in Europe. Post constraint equals one if the trade was opened after the CFTC regulation went into effect on October 18, 2010, zero otherwise. Trader and day fixed-effects are γ i and γt, respectively. Standard errors are double-clustered by day and trader, and *, **, and *** denote the following significance levels p < 0.10 , p < 0.05 , and p < 0.01 , respectively. 
The regression includes multiple observations per each trade j, one for every 10-minute holding period until the position closes. The dependent variable sale equals one if trader i closes position j in period t. The independent variable gain equals one if the position is a paper gain in period t. Trader and calendar time fixed effects are γ i and γt, respectively. The regressions include holding period fixed effects, which is a set of indicator variables for every 10-minute interval starting after the position opens. Standard errors are double-clustered by day and trader, and *, **, and *** denote the following significance levels p < 0.10 , p < 0.05 , and p < 0.01 , respectively. 
The earnings i,t variable corresponds to each investor's per period earnings at the beginning of period t. The disposition.effect in t-1 variable corresponds to the investor's per-period disposition effect in the end of period t-1. Period fixed effects are included in the regressions. Standard errors, clustered at the participant level, are in parenthesis, and *, **, and *** denote the following significance levels p < 0.10 , p < 0.05 , and p < 0.01 , respectively.
dep var: 
The disposition.effect in t variable corresponds to the investor's per-period disposition effect in the end of period t. The trader can use leverage (=1) variable corresponds to being in the Leverage treatment (if = 1) or the No Leverage treatment (if = 0) in period t. Period fixed effects are included in the regressions. Standard errors, clustered at the participant level, are in parenthesis, and *, **, and *** denote the following significance levels p < 0.10 , p < 0.05 , and p < 0.01 , respectively. 
